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1 In this book on Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor, the mythical patron figure of Chinese
civilization, Térence Billeter presents a meticulously documented study on the Chinese
authorities’ use of traditional culture today. His main thesis is that the Beijing regime is
in  this  way  seeking  to  “build  an  alternative  model  of  modernity  to  counter  the
dominant Western one” (p. 432). This nationalist ideology seeks above all to impart a
renewed legitimacy to the authorities in rallying their new social base, “the emerging
urban  and  cosmopolitan  bourgeoisie.”  In  the  process,  they  perpetuate  a  vision  of
politics  harking  back  to  the  imperial  state’s  creation.  The  work  consists  of  nine
chapters and copious annexes. The first chapter plunges into the heart of the matter
with  a  lively  description  of  a  1999  ceremony  in  Huangling,  a  township  in  Shaanxi
province, where the shrine of the Yellow Emperor is located. The second chapter leaps
back  to  another  epoch,  1688,  and  to  similar  ceremonies  through  which  Billeter
introduces the practice of venerating Huangdi and, more generally, imperial cults. The
third chapter, on the “nationalist transfiguration” (p. 20) of Huangdi, tries to make a
link between these two dates by focusing on a certain number of cults taking place
towards the end of the imperial era (for instance by the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance,
Tongmenghui),  under  the Republic,  during the Anti-Japanese  war  (Kuomintang and
Communist delegates paid a joint homage to Huangdi in 1937 and 1938), and during the
early years of the People’s Republic. Though suspended during the Cultural Revolution,
the practice revived in the reform era. The author shows how the rituals have changed
with the passage of time and have always been adapted to the needs of the moment.
2 Then comes a broader reflection on Chinese nationalism, its history dealt with at the
outset  of  the  fourth  chapter  to  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  different
connotations  of  the  Huangdi  figure  at  given  times,  especially  as  creator  of  the
centralised state and/or ancestor of the race. The next chapter pursues this enquiry in
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Communist China. The retreat of nationalism in the face of socialism, the symbolically
inappropriate  nature  of  the  allusion  to  the  Han  race  or  nation  (in  the  context  of
internationalism or absorption of minority nationalities), and the personality cult of
the Great  Helmsman are  among the factors  that  explain the gradual  eclipse  of  the
Huangdi  figure.  Billeter  notes  the  return  in  the  1980s  of  a  mix  of  tradition  and
socialism1,  whereas the 1990s were, in his view, characterized by nationalism as the
dominant  trait  in  Chinese  political  discourse.  In  this  context,  he  explains  that  the
Huangdi  figure  underwent  a  real  consecration  by  the  authorities  (p.191),  who,
depending on what they wanted to achieve, played on different themes: founding hero
(of the political), civilizer (since the Chinese state, the author holds, sees itself as the
incarnation  and  agent  of  civilization)  and  progenitor  (ancestor  of  the  Hanand,  by
extension, the Chinese nation) (p.240-42).
3 In the next section the author goes beyond the specific case of the Yellow Emperor to
reflect on the role of culture in the creation of political legitimacy in China today. He
first studies a list of 100 patriotic sites presented in official propaganda (chapter 6)
before taking a more theoretical approach to the debate (chapter 7). Proceeding from
reflections on the difference between nationalism and patriotism and on theories of
nation, he shows how, gradually and in a decisive manner, the relative weight given to
socialism  and  a  reinvented  and  partially  remobilized  high  traditional  culture
(depending on its utility) become reversed in Communist Party discourse (p. 313). He
perceives a return of zhengtong, a way of legitimating politics through reference to the
past (p.343) directed by regime propaganda “smoothly” using mass culture (p.348 sq).
After having set the general political scene, the remainder of the book refocuses on
Huangdi.  The eighth chapter  looks at  two connected aspects:  tourism — which the
authorities are developing — and popular religion. Billeter briefly evokes the relation
that has built up around this last issue between the peasantry and political authorities
looking to promote a neutralized veneration shorn of “superstition.” The last chapter is
a more general reflection on the foundation of the political, the author showing that
the Beijing regime deliberately displays some aspects of a symbolic system that has
played a role in the imperial state’s ideological construction (p. 397), thus perpetuating
“a vision of politics whose origins go back to the establishment of the imperial state
two  millennia  ago.”  In  developing  these  theses,  the  book  considers  an  impressive
number  and  diversity  of  materials  while  situating  itself  in  an  interdisciplinary
approach that ranges from political science to fairly broad sociological considerations,
to  anthropological  observation  of  precise  events  in  historical  perspective.  Such  an
approach is theoretically rich, and the essay is lively and readable despite its length.
Basically, Billeter puts forth sound arguments to back his analyses of the centrality of
cultural nationalism that Chinese authorities use today as an alternative to modernity.
One  need  not  entirely  agree  with  his  analysis  to  appreciate  the  merit  of  Billeter’s
coherent  thesis  on  the  regime’s  ideological  evolution,  which  constitutes  a  major
contribution to the debate. Having made these points, however, some limitations of the
study need to be noted. Firstly — as acknowledged in his own introduction — Billeter
systematically adopts a “top-down” approach that ultimately perceives reality through
the prism of the authorities and elites2,  in whom is vested the initiative in cultural
matters, faced with a society that seems little more than a material on which their
mark  can  be  left.  This  is  paradoxical,  given  that  the  author  devotes  remarkable
attention  to  China’s  social  evolution  in  the  1990s,  which,  it  may  be  noted,  greatly
contributes  to  the  book’s  interest.  The  question  of  the  interaction  between  the
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authorities  and  a  people  whose  “horizon  of  expectations”  extends  along  with  the
expansion of its “field of experience” is only infrequently considered. If there is one
phenomenon that characterizes the historicity of the start of the new century in China,
it is precisely that society is also reappropriating some fragments of its past heritage3.
In this respect, it would no doubt have been interesting to further distinguish, in the
reappearance  of  a  discourse  dealing  with  culture,  that  which  stems  from  a  policy
conceived at the top and imposed on those at the bottom (in a manner that is still quasi
totalitarian) and that which corresponds to the response the authorities come up with
to deal with (if  not weaken) the aspirations of a society that is now enjoying much
greater autonomy4.
4 With this, the discussion emerges from the strict confines of the Yellow Emperor to
consider  “high  traditional  culture”  more  generally,  though  the  concept  remains
extremely  vague.  Another  limitation  of  the  work  may  be  underlined  at  this  point,
where Billeter uses the Huangdi  figure to present a  much larger and more general
thesis on the development of a cultural nationalism in China. In what way doesn’t it go
too  far?  While  it  is  often  noted  that  the  authorities  cannot  lose  sight  of  socialist
heritage in their use of culture, the book nevertheless gives the impression that the
game  is  set  for  the  present,  and  that  cultural  nationalism  is  shaping  up  as  the
indubitable new source of legitimacy for the authorities. Is that really so? What of the
strength of  socialist  tradition in  China?  What  other  hypotheses  may be  envisaged?
These questions are not really discussed. While they need not necessarily form part of a
work  limited  to  Huangdi,  they  are  nevertheless  central  to  a  larger  analysis  of  the
regime’s  ideological  evolution.  Finally,  another  question  may  be  posed:  Doesn’t
Huangdi lend himself particularly well to this type of interpretation precisely because
he is, as Billeter shows only too well, a nationalist icon? In other words, using Huangdi,
would it be possible to come to definitive conclusions on the appropriation of “high
traditional culture” by the authorities? As he considers the difficulty of proceeding in
this manner, the author chooses to expand the debate using interesting developments:
analyses of lists of patriotic sites drawn up by the regime (which also helps gauge the
weight  given  to  socialist heritage)  or  frequent  evocation  of  other  figures  such  as
Confucius.
5 The Huangdi/Confucius parallel is especially interesting. Billeter shows quite well that
historically, the recourse to one or other of these two figures is not a neutral activity.
Furthermore,  one  has  sometimes  been  invoked  to  counter  the  other.  Thus  Zhang
Binglin  (1869-1936)  was  able  to  invoke  the  figure  of  Huangdi,  ancestor  of  the  Han
nation,  to  instil  a  national  feeling  detached  from  Confucianism  and  rejecting  the
“imperial tradition” (p. 135). In the very heart of the Kuomintang era, during the “New
Life Movement” ( xin shenghuo yundong) launched in 1934, which claimed in many
respects  to  have  Confucian  values,  a  proto-fascist  faction  was  disdainful  of
cosmopolitan and Confucian universalism, preferring instead the racial exclusivity of
Huangdi (p. 159). Even today, we might add, Confucius and the Yellow Emperor stand
for entirely different things. The ancestor figure (or, in the author’s words, that of the
founding hero, civiliser and progenitor) is not that of a Master or Sage. And if one talks
of  zhengtong  (see  above),  it  is  not  possible  to  forget  that  Confucianism  is  also
historically  linked to  Daotong,  i.e.  to  the transmission of  the Way,  imbuing it  with
clearly  subversive  potential5.  Billeter  repeatedly  stresses  the  current  recourse  to
Confucianism: he mentions its “spectacular return to grace” in the 1990s (p.190), the
philosophical bases established by the new Confucians since the late 1950s (p.266), the
Térence Billeter, L’Empereur jaune, Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2007, 549 pp.
China Perspectives, 2007/4 | 2007
3
resumption of Confucius anniversary ceremonies at Qufu, and even the promotion of
the moralising role of  Confucius (pp.  347,  430),  “whose teaching is  recalled to help
restructure  Chinese  society”6.  While  the  increasing  reference  to  Confucianism  and
other  aspects  of  “high  Chinese  culture”  is  undeniable,  these  elements  should
nevertheless be considered with caution. The return to grace in the1990s is notable in
the context of the situation that prevailed in the 1980s, but it is highly marginal in
terms of the totality of ideological output by the regime during this period and remains
largely  circumscribed in  the  academic  world.  On the  other  hand,  the  philosophical
bases of the system promoted by the authorities are certainly not those of the new
Confucians referred to in the book, who are mostly ardent advocates of Western-style
democracy and promoters of a universalist humanism (much more than of any narrow
nationalism).  It  is  also through direct references to democracy,  deemed a universal
dharma, that a Confucian such as Mou Zongsan, who is an inheritor of the May 4th
Movement, reinterprets what should be the new zhengtong. It may also be noted that
the authorities generally observe the utmost prudence on another front, that of some
forms  of  intellectual  and  “illiberal”  Confucianism  that  are  now  growing  in  the
continent. As for official celebrations in Qufu, a more detailed analysis might conclude
that the government would organise them very differently if it were really concerned
with restoring the old Sage to a prominence. For all these reasons, it appears that the
Confucius figure is actually more difficult to mobilise than the Yellow Emperor. If the
authorities do re-appropriate it partially and episodically, it is always with caution and
no doubt to associate their action in the cultural domain with Chinese society’s ongoing
massive rediscovery of its past7. None of these remarks in any way detract from the
very high quality of work presented in l’Empereur jaune. Erudite and absorbing, the
book will certainly become a durable reference for those interested in the relationship
between power and culture in contemporary China.
6 Translated by N JayaramTérence Billeter, L’Empereur jaune, Paris, Les Indes savantes,
2007, 549 pp.
7 Sébastien Billioud
8 China Perspectives n°72, 2007/4, page n°0
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10 In this book on Huangdi, the Yellow Emperor, the mythical patron figure of Chinese
civilization, Térence Billeter presents a meticulously documented study on the Chinese
authorities’ use of traditional culture today. His main thesis is that the Beijing regime is
in  this  way  seeking  to  “build  an  alternative  model  of  modernity  to  counter  the
dominant Western one” (p. 432). This nationalist ideology seeks above all to impart a
renewed legitimacy to the authorities in rallying their new social base, “the emerging
urban  and  cosmopolitan  bourgeoisie.”  In  the  process,  they  perpetuate  a  vision  of
politics  harking  back  to  the  imperial  state’s  creation.  The  work  consists  of  nine
chapters and copious annexes. The first chapter plunges into the heart of the matter
with  a  lively  description  of  a  1999  ceremony  in  Huangling,  a  township  in  Shaanxi
province, where the shrine of the Yellow Emperor is located. The second chapter leaps
back  to  another  epoch,  1688,  and  to  similar  ceremonies  through  which  Billeter
introduces the practice of venerating Huangdi and, more generally, imperial cults. The
third chapter, on the “nationalist transfiguration” (p. 20) of Huangdi, tries to make a
link between these two dates by focusing on a certain number of cults taking place
towards the end of the imperial era (for instance by the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance,
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Tongmenghui),  under  the Republic,  during the Anti-Japanese  war  (Kuomintang and
Communist delegates paid a joint homage to Huangdi in 1937 and 1938), and during the
early years of the People’s Republic. Though suspended during the Cultural Revolution,
the practice revived in the reform era. The author shows how the rituals have changed
with the passage of time and have always been adapted to the needs of the moment.
11 Then comes a broader reflection on Chinese nationalism, its history dealt with at the
outset  of  the  fourth  chapter  to  provide  a  better  understanding  of  the  different
connotations  of  the  Huangdi  figure  at  given  times,  especially  as  creator  of  the
centralised state and/or ancestor of the race. The next chapter pursues this enquiry in
Communist China. The retreat of nationalism in the face of socialism, the symbolically
inappropriate  nature  of  the  allusion  to  the  Han  race  or  nation  (in  the  context  of
internationalism or absorption of minority nationalities), and the personality cult of
the Great  Helmsman are  among the factors  that  explain the gradual  eclipse  of  the
Huangdi  figure.  Billeter  notes  the  return  in  the  1980s  of  a  mix  of  tradition  and
socialism,(1) whereas the 1990s were, in his view, characterized by nationalism as the
dominant  trait  in  Chinese  political  discourse.  In  this  context,  he  explains  that  the
Huangdi  figure  underwent  a  real  consecration  by  the  authorities  (p.191),  who,
depending on what they wanted to achieve, played on different themes: founding hero
(of the political), civilizer (since the Chinese state, the author holds, sees itself as the
incarnation  and  agent  of  civilization)  and  progenitor  (ancestor  of  the  Hanand,  by
extension, the Chinese nation) (p.240-42).
12 In the next section the author goes beyond the specific case of the Yellow Emperor to
reflect on the role of culture in the creation of political legitimacy in China today. He
first studies a list of 100 patriotic sites presented in official propaganda (chapter 6)
before taking a more theoretical approach to the debate (chapter 7). Proceeding from
reflections on the difference between nationalism and patriotism and on theories of
nation, he shows how, gradually and in a decisive manner, the relative weight given to
socialism  and  a  reinvented  and  partially  remobilized  high  traditional  culture
(depending on its utility) become reversed in Communist Party discourse (p. 313). He
perceives a return of zhengtong, a way of legitimating politics through reference to the
past (p.343) directed by regime propaganda “smoothly” using mass culture (p.348 sq).
After having set the general political scene, the remainder of the book refocuses on
Huangdi.  The eighth chapter  looks at  two connected aspects:  tourism — which the
authorities are developing — and popular religion. Billeter briefly evokes the relation
that has built up around this last issue between the peasantry and political authorities
looking to promote a neutralized veneration shorn of “superstition.” The last chapter is
a more general reflection on the foundation of the political, the author showing that
the Beijing regime deliberately displays some aspects of a symbolic system that has
played a role in the imperial state’s ideological construction (p. 397), thus perpetuating
“a vision of politics whose origins go back to the establishment of the imperial state
two  millennia  ago.”  In  developing  these  theses,  the  book  considers  an  impressive
number  and  diversity  of  materials  while  situating  itself  in  an  interdisciplinary
approach that ranges from political science to fairly broad sociological considerations,
to  anthropological  observation  of  precise  events  in  historical  perspective.  Such  an
approach is theoretically rich, and the essay is lively and readable despite its length.
Basically, Billeter puts forth sound arguments to back his analyses of the centrality of
cultural nationalism that Chinese authorities use today as an alternative to modernity.
One  need  not  entirely  agree  with  his  analysis  to  appreciate  the  merit  of  Billeter’s
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coherent  thesis  on  the  regime’s  ideological  evolution,  which  constitutes  a  major
contribution to the debate. Having made these points, however, some limitations of the
study need to be noted. Firstly — as acknowledged in his own introduction — Billeter
systematically adopts a “top-down” approach that ultimately perceives reality through
the prism of the authorities and elites,(2) in whom is vested the initiative in cultural
matters, faced with a society that seems little more than a material on which their
mark  can  be  left.  This  is  paradoxical,  given  that  the  author  devotes  remarkable
attention  to  China’s  social  evolution  in  the  1990s,  which,  it  may  be  noted,  greatly
contributes  to  the  book’s  interest.  The  question  of  the  interaction  between  the
authorities  and  a  people  whose  “horizon  of  expectations”  extends  along  with  the
expansion of its “field of experience” is only infrequently considered. If there is one
phenomenon that characterizes the historicity of the start of the new century in China,
it is precisely that society is also reappropriating some fragments of its past heritage.
(3) In this respect, it would no doubt have been interesting to further distinguish, in the
reappearance  of  a  discourse  dealing  with  culture,  that  which  stems  from  a  policy
conceived at the top and imposed on those at the bottom (in a manner that is still quasi
totalitarian) and that which corresponds to the response the authorities come up with
to deal with (if  not weaken) the aspirations of a society that is now enjoying much
greater autonomy.( 4)
13 With this, the discussion emerges from the strict confines of the Yellow Emperor to
consider  “high  traditional  culture”  more  generally,  though  the  concept  remains
extremely  vague.  Another  limitation  of  the  work  may  be  underlined  at  this  point,
where Billeter uses the Huangdi  figure to present a  much larger and more general
thesis on the development of a cultural nationalism in China. In what way doesn’t it go
too  far?  While  it  is  often  noted  that  the  authorities  cannot  lose  sight  of  socialist
heritage in their use of culture, the book nevertheless gives the impression that the
game  is  set  for  the  present,  and  that  cultural  nationalism  is  shaping  up  as  the
indubitable new source of legitimacy for the authorities. Is that really so? What of the
strength of  socialist  tradition in  China?  What  other  hypotheses  may be  envisaged?
These questions are not really discussed. While they need not necessarily form part of a
work  limited  to  Huangdi,  they  are  nevertheless  central  to  a  larger  analysis  of  the
regime’s  ideological  evolution.  Finally,  another  question  may  be  posed:  Doesn’t
Huangdi lend himself particularly well to this type of interpretation precisely because
he is, as Billeter shows only too well, a nationalist icon? In other words, using Huangdi,
would it be possible to come to definitive conclusions on the appropriation of “high
traditional culture” by the authorities? As he considers the difficulty of proceeding in
this manner, the author chooses to expand the debate using interesting developments:
analyses of lists of patriotic sites drawn up by the regime (which also helps gauge the
weight  given  to  socialist heritage)  or  frequent  evocation  of  other  figures  such  as
Confucius.
14 The Huangdi/Confucius parallel is especially interesting. Billeter shows quite well that
historically, the recourse to one or other of these two figures is not a neutral activity.
Furthermore,  one  has  sometimes  been  invoked  to  counter  the  other.  Thus  Zhang
Binglin  (1869-1936)  was  able  to  invoke  the  figure  of  Huangdi,  ancestor  of  the  Han
nation,  to  instil  a  national  feeling  detached  from  Confucianism  and  rejecting  the
“imperial tradition” (p. 135). In the very heart of the Kuomintang era, during the “New
Life Movement” ( xin shenghuo yundong) launched in 1934, which claimed in many
respects  to  have  Confucian  values,  a  proto-fascist  faction  was  disdainful  of
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cosmopolitan and Confucian universalism, preferring instead the racial exclusivity of
Huangdi (p. 159). Even today, we might add, Confucius and the Yellow Emperor stand
for entirely different things. The ancestor figure (or, in the author’s words, that of the
founding hero, civiliser and progenitor) is not that of a Master or Sage. And if one talks
of  zhengtong  (see  above),  it  is  not  possible  to  forget  that  Confucianism  is  also
historically  linked to  Daotong,  i.e.  to  the transmission of  the Way,  imbuing it  with
clearly  subversive  potential.(5)  Billeter  repeatedly  stresses  the  current  recourse  to
Confucianism: he mentions its “spectacular return to grace” in the 1990s (p.190), the
philosophical bases established by the new Confucians since the late 1950s (p.266), the
resumption of Confucius anniversary ceremonies at Qufu, and even the promotion of
the moralising role of  Confucius (pp.  347,  430),  “whose teaching is  recalled to help
restructure Chinese society.”(6) While the increasing reference to Confucianism and
other  aspects  of  “high  Chinese  culture”  is  undeniable,  these  elements  should
nevertheless be considered with caution. The return to grace in the1990s is notable in
the context of the situation that prevailed in the 1980s, but it is highly marginal in
terms of the totality of ideological output by the regime during this period and remains
largely  circumscribed in  the  academic  world.  On the  other  hand,  the  philosophical
bases of the system promoted by the authorities are certainly not those of the new
Confucians referred to in the book, who are mostly ardent advocates of Western-style
democracy and promoters of a universalist humanism (much more than of any narrow
nationalism).  It  is  also through direct references to democracy,  deemed a universal
dharma, that a Confucian such as Mou Zongsan, who is an inheritor of the May 4th
Movement, reinterprets what should be the new zhengtong. It may also be noted that
the authorities generally observe the utmost prudence on another front, that of some
forms  of  intellectual  and  “illiberal”  Confucianism  that  are  now  growing  in  the
continent. As for official celebrations in Qufu, a more detailed analysis might conclude
that the government would organise them very differently if it were really concerned
with restoring the old Sage to a prominence. For all these reasons, it appears that the
Confucius figure is actually more difficult to mobilise than the Yellow Emperor. If the
authorities do re-appropriate it partially and episodically, it is always with caution and
no doubt to associate their action in the cultural domain with Chinese society’s ongoing
massive rediscovery of its past.(7) None of these remarks in any way detract from the
very high quality of work presented in l’Empereur jaune. Erudite and absorbing, the
book will certainly become a durable reference for those interested in the relationship
between power and culture in contemporary China.
15 Translated by N Jayaram
NOTES
1. Under the slogan “building a socialist spiritual civilization” (p.185)
2. Authorities and elites are clubbed together here because the author often bases his
argumentation on writings that are not, strictly speaking, official discourses but rather
conference papers or articles and works by professors. It should be stressed in passing
Térence Billeter, L’Empereur jaune, Paris, Les Indes savantes, 2007, 549 pp.
China Perspectives, 2007/4 | 2007
7
that problems can arise when interpreting this type of documents in the same way as
materials of a more official nature (speeches or five-year plans, among others)
3. See, for example, the article by Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval in this issue of
China Perspectives.
4. Billeter certainly insists on a link between the authorities and their social base.
While referring to the Communist Party, he says that “its basic objective is to formulate
an ideology for its new social base – the emerging urban and cosmopolitan bourgeoisie
– in order to ensure its cohesion and gain its loyalty at a time of capitalist
globalisation” (p. 432). However, the arrangement here remains one in which the
initiative is always with the authorities. This is all the more evident when he says, “the
Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in modifying the rapport between the
population, especially in urban areas, and high traditional culture” (p. 349). However,
there is little discussion of the relationship that this “social base” (by no means
homogenous) may on its own maintain with classical culture.
5. A classic response to this is to stress that Confucianism’s subversive power is far
from having been dramatically manifested in history. While refraining here from
joining in that debate, it may be simply stressed that in China today, some aspects of
current Confucianism (rediscovered, reinvented, or re-imported) could present, for the
authorities, a subversive potential.
6. All these elements back his thesis on current nationalism, which, as he has very well
explained, is not founded on Confucianism alone (p. 305): “The regime’s ideologues
have clearly preferred to embed the new Confucianism in a much larger sense of
national spirit, thus avoiding turning a philosophical orthodoxy into the sole criterion
of Chineseness
7. On these issues, see Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, ‘Cultural Tradition,’ and
Official Discourse in China at the Start of the New Century,” in China Perspectives, no.
2007/3, pp. 50-65.
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